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ABSTRACT

This essay explores the manner in which the political
and intellectual origin of the speech and press provisions
of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States can be explained by the political theory of James
Madison.
The analysis begins with an examination of the
constitutional theory of James Madison.
In particular,
various of Madison's conceptual devices, which he combined
for the purpose of controlling the dangerous influence of
factions in an extended republic, are explored.
The analysis continues with an examination of the
partisan struggle surrounding the creation and ratification
of the Constitution and how that struggle made the creation
of the Bill of Rights a political necessity.
Finally, it is argued that Madison championed adoption
of the First Amendment because it both satisfied his
political interests and complimented his political theory.
In addition, the author suggests that Madison's political
theory provides the most meaningful context in which to
understand the role of free speech and a free press in the
American constitutional tradition.

JAMES MADISON AND THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

What the production of steel was to the industrial age,
the management and dissemination of information is to our
age.

Indeed, the so-called post-industrial age in which we

now live has so often been referred to as the information
age that the term itself has become something of a cliche:
it is familiar from overuse, yet suggests more than it
explains.

In any event, recognizing the importance of

exchanging information and ideas is not something unique to
the information age.

Ever since the creation of the First

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, preserving the
expression of ideas has come to occupy an exalted place in
the American political paradigm.

In particular, by

characterizing speech and press as guaranteed freedoms, the
First Amendment suggests that the founding fathers
recognized the importance of information exchange as a
necessary component of constitutional government.
Ascertaining exactly how important or how necessary a
component the founders considered these freedoms to be,
however, is a difficult proposition.

Unfortunately, in many

respects the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment are like the term "information age:”
more than they explain.
2

they suggest

3

Attempting to understand the significance of speech and
press freedoms in our system of government, therefore, is
more difficult than at first supposed.

While some might

think these freedoms are so central to our nation's
political values that to ask the question at all is
ridiculous,1 if they are in fact so centrally important,
then their meaning should be readily discoverable by
analysis and thoughtful inquiry.

Though the rhetorical

explanation emerges almost reflexively, explaining that a
free press and free speech are fundamental pre-requisites of
a free society, it is interesting to note that such a selfevident truth is not borne out by examining the intentions
and political theory of the founders.

Indeed, the

historical record suggests that the First Federal Congress
crafted the First Amendment in 1789 for the express purpose

1 Thomas Kuhn writes that 11[s]cientists [and by
inference social scientists] work from models acquired
through education and through subsequent exposure to the
literature often without quite knowing or needing to know
what characteristics have given these models the status of
community paradigms. And because they do so, they need no
full set of rules. The coherence displayed by the research
tradition in which they participate may not imply even the
existence of an underlying body of rules and assumptions
that additional historical or philosophical investigation
might uncover.
That scientists do not usually ask or debate
what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate
tempts us to suppose that, at least intuitively, they know
the answer. But it may only indicate that neither the
question nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their
research.
Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more
complete than any set of rules for research that could be
unequivocally abstracted from them.” Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970), 46.
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of silencing Antifederalist critics who still desired, some
two years after the Constitutional Convention, to scuttle
the new national government.

Moreover, the historical

record suggests that the First Amendment was crafted in such
a way as to essentially leave in place, unaltered, the
political framework of the 1787 constitution.
Nonetheless, the historical record does support the
notion that speech and press freedom do have a role to play
in the constitutional model of republican government
envisioned by the founders.

And to the extent that this

original conception continues to infuse the contemporary
constitutional order with meaning, speech and press freedom
continue to play an instrumental role.

To fully understand

what this role is, however, requires that we use the
historical record in general, and the writings of James
Madison in particular, to deconstruct, and thereby
transcend, the rhetorical record in order to create a
satisfactory model explaining the enduring significance of
speech and press freedom.

By doing so, not only is the

First Amendment infused with more particularized historical
meaning but its role in the political order, both past and
present, will emerge more meaningfully as well.

CHAPTER I
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGIN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States occupies a singularly important, if not sacred,
position in the American political tradition.

The ability

to speak one's mind, publish one's sentiments, criticize
government, and advocate or agitate for political change
generally free from official restraint are the hallmarks of
American-style democracy.

Nonetheless, the First Amendment,

and all that it has come to represent in our contemporary
political order, did not emerge effortlessly from the
founding era.

On the contrary, the origin of the First

Amendment, speech and press freedom in particular, is best
understood as a product of the various intellectual,
political and cultural forces that shaped the nature and the
substance of the political debate in the United States
during the last decades of the eighteenth century.

To come

to terms with origin of the First Amendment, we must address
each of these forces individually.
intellectual.

5

We begin with the
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A. The Documentary Record of the Founding Fathers
Though the historical record explaining the origin and
original purpose of the First Amendment spans the entire
founding era, of particular significance is the period from
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 through the First
Federal Congress in 1789.

Unfortunately, examining even

this limited period presents significant difficulties.
Foremost among these is undoubtedly the quality and
credibility of the primary sources themselves.

For example,

historian James H. Hutson documents how the notes of Robert
Yates, published in 1821 as the Secret Proceedings and
Debates of the Convention Assembled at Philadelphia in the
Year 1787. were so significantly altered under the partisan
editorship of Edmond C. "Citizen" Genet that they "cannot be
considered a reliable record of what occurred at the
Philadelphia Convention and cannot be consulted as a source
of the intentions of the framers."2 Even the Notes of James
Madison, considered by many to be the most reliable record
of the Constitutional Convention, are frequently criticized.
For example, Madison seems to have recorded his own comments
with a degree of thoroughness, arguably bordering on
embellishment, curiously lacking in the comments attributed
to other delegates.3 Unfortunately, the official record of

2 James H. Hutson, "The Creation of the Constitution:y
The Integrity of the Documentary Record," Texas Law Review
65 (November 1986): 9-12.
3 Ibid. 31-33.
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the Constitutional Convention is just as questionable.

For

example, Max Farrand, editor of the first standard
compilation of the official record of the Constitutional
Convention, warns readers that the Journal of the Convention
was so carelessly kept that it cannot be relied upon
absolutely.

In particular, on the matter of debates and

votes, Farrand suggests that the Journal "should be accepted
somewhat tentatively."4
The shortcomings of the historical record are at least
partially explained by the fact that the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention met in secrecy and had every
reason for wanting to keep their deliberations strictly
confidential.

After all, delegates to the convention had

gathered for the politically charged purpose of amending and
perhaps replacing the existing federal government.

Toward

this end, the Convention was closed to non-delegates, the
press was barred from attending, and rules of procedure
adopted at the start of the Convention prohibited members
from discussing convention business outside the meeting
hall.5

Even the various letters from convention delegates

to friends and colleagues are questionable in that they
represent the selective dissemination of privileged

4 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787. rev. ed. (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1937) 1: xiii-xiv.
5 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787, bicentennial edition (New York: Norton,
1987), 27-28.
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information.
Serious questions exist about the provenance of the
documentary records of the state ratifying conventions as
well.

For example, Hutson describes Jonathan Elliot's

Debates, the standard documentary collection of the
deliberations of the state ratifying conventions, as a
"bibliographical brainteaser, for it was republished in at
least seven ... editions [following the original 1827-1830
edition], in differing numbers of volumes, with the contents
of individual volumes differing in many cases from edition
to edition."6 Additionally, Hutson argues that Elliot
appears to have let contemporary political concerns, such as
nullification, shade his presentation of the record.
Moreover, the primary records themselves appear to reflect
the selective, partisan sympathies of the various
individuals who originally recorded the debates.
The documentary record of the First Amendment is
similarly incomplete.

As Hutson observes, only half of the

debate in the First Congress over the Bill of Rights
survives in that the Senate prohibited its proceedings from
being recorded.

As for the proceedings in the House, Hutson

notes that the official record, as reported by Thomas Lloyd,
most clearly evidences not the proceedings, but Lloyd's
wandering mind in that his notes are "periodically
interrupted by doodling, sketches of members, horses and

6 Hutson, 13.
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landscapes, and by poetry.”7
With such limitations in the documentary record, it is
appropriate to ask if it is at all possible to ascertain
what the founders intended.

More importantly still, the

question arises that given what we know about the divisive
and often secretive nature of American politics in our own
age, what is the likelihood that the body of law created by
the founders is attributable to a readily ascertainable
intent?

If little or none, it becomes doubly unlikely that

we can speak of the founders' intentions in anything more
than a vaguely generalized fashion.

Even on issues where

the founders compromised or appeared to agree with one
another, it is possible, indeed likely, that their
intentions for doing so varied.

Consequently, one might

reasonably argue that the founders' collective intent, if it
existed at all, is unknowable, just as it was probably
unknown to them.
While we may never know what constitutes the original
intent of the founding fathers, we can discern the general
political theory which animated their vision of republican
government.

More specifically, primary sources provide us

with a fairly comprehensive view of James Madison's
constitutional philosophy.

As previously mentioned, his

Notes are generally considered the most reliable account of
the Constitutional Convention.

7 Ibid., 36.

Following that, according to

10

Farrand and others, the Federalist Papers (a series of
anonymous essays defending and the Constitution in the weeks
preceding the New York ratifying convention), of which
Madison was one of the principal authors, are the second
most reliable source of original intent.

In regard to the

Bill of Rights, the documentary record of the First Federal
Congress, though questionable as noted above, reveals
Madison to be the driving force behind its inception.
Furthermore, a wealth of supporting essays, articles and
letters give us unparalleled additional insight into the
political theory of Madison.

Essentially, the historical

record lends itself most readily to a determination of what
Madison perceived to be the intent of the Constitution.
Whether this perception was solely his own or reflected the
views of his peers as well is difficult to determine.
Nonetheless, as Hutson observes, the shortcomings of
Madison's Notes are the yardstick (as I would argue all of
his work can be characterized) by which we can measure the
difficulty in determining the delegates' intentions.8

B.

The Founder's Original Intent

What Madison's Notes unquestionably reveal is that the
Constitutional Convention did not agonize over, or even
seriously consider, affording special protection to the

8 Ibid.. 35.
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freedoms of speech and press.

Indeed, aside from a proposal

for a bill of rights (including a speech and press
provision) by South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney
(which later died in committee), and a disingenuous eleventh
hour effort to scuttle the Constitution by delegates who
held ulterior motives, the Notes indicate that speech and
press freedom were not a serious concern of the Convention.
In fact, it was not until political pressure arising from
the ratification struggle forced the issue two years later
that the First Congress undertook the effort to amend the
Constitution with a bill of rights, including a free speech
and press guarantee.

Even then, the documentary records of

the First Federal Congress indicate that the only prolonged
debate over protecting speech and press centered not on
whether these two were essential to the new framework of
government, but whether members of Congress should be
obligated to vote in the manner which popular opinion
dictated.

In response, Madison unequivocally assured his

fellow legislators that they were not required to vote in
Congress per the instructions of their constituents.9
While Madison's response may strike modern readers as
surprisingly undemocratic, it is not at variance with
Madison's constitutional theory.

Indeed, nothing in any of

9 Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs
Bickford, eds., Creating the Bill of Rights; the Documentary
Record from the First Federal Congress (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 153-156.
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Madison's writings from the founding era supports the notion
that he viewed protecting press and speech freedom as
essential to the creation, execution or adjudication of laws
—

which, by any reasonable definition, is the basic purpose

of government.

Even when the freedoms of speech and press

were elevated to the status of constitutionally protected
rights, nothing in the documentary record suggests that the
founders held a well articulated idea that what they were
protecting was somehow fundamentally significant to the
administration of government.10 On the contrary, in a
letter to Richard Peters dated August 18, 1789, Madison
described the creation of the Bill of Rights not as
essential, but as a "nauseous project," one which he
undertook for the expressly political purpose of silencing
opponents to the Constitution and to honor campaign
promises.11
Whether we interpret "nauseous project" as referring to
the arduous political struggle that amending the
Constitution would require, or more fundamentally as
Madison's reluctance to adulterate the unamended
Constitution with needless provisions, we will see it is
clear that Madison was less than convinced that amendments
were necessary.

Nonetheless, Madison's eventual support and

10 Leonard Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 267.
11 Veit, et al., Creating the Bill of Rights. 281-282.
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championing of the amendment cause is directly attributable
to his political and intellectual commitment to the new
federal Constitution:

without amendments, the Constitution

would remain politically vulnerable and the intellectual
justification on which it rested would remain in perpetual
jeopardy.

In sum, it was not until Madison became assured

that the Constitution could be amended in a manner which
would preserve its structural integrity, while at the same
time defeating Antifederalist rhetoric, that he became
convinced that amendments were appropriate even if
unnecessary.

C. The Political Theory of James Madison
1.

intellectual and historical antecedents

James Madison's political theory was undoubtedly
influenced by both the intellectual and political climate of
his time.

In 1769, at the age of eighteen, Madison entered

the College of New Jersey at Princeton.

Over the course of

the next three years, Madison was exposed to the writings of
most of the political philosophers who dominated
intellectual life in the eighteenth century.

In particular,

as Ralph Ketcham describes, Madison was especially enamored
by the writings of John Locke, accepting the notion that the
human "mind is blank at birth [receives] all its furnishings
through the senses ... and [can] hold an infinite variety of

14

insights and opinions.12 As a matter of cosmology,
Madison took the Newton-Locke world view at face value:
the universe was marvelously harmonious; the discovery
of facts about man and society would lead to progress
and enlightenment; empiricism and dependence on laws
of cause and effect were not incompatabile; and moral
and social, as well as physical, understandings would
benefit from the application of human study and
reason.13
Madison also came of age in colonial America at a time
when society at large placed a high value on open discourse
concerning political matters.

For example, the writings of

“Cato" (the pen name of influential English journalists John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon), which advocated that truth
should be a defense in prosecutions for seditious libel (a
criminal cause of action punishing defamatory criticism of
public officials), had been very popular in colonial America
since the 1720's.14

In fact, as David Rabbin argues, the

popularity of Cato's Letters, and the report of the Peter
Zenger trial, were not only widely quoted and reported, but
they virtually "eliminated prosecutions for seditious libel
in the colonies.1,15 Nonetheless, as Leonard Levy observes,
as of 1776, "[n]o state [had] abolished or altered the

12 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography
(Charlottesville': University of Virginia Press, 1990) , 51.
13 Ibid. , 50.
14 David M. Rabban, "Historical Perspectives on the Free
Press: [Book] Review Essay: The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American
History." 37 Stanford Law Review 795, 806 (1985).
15 Ibid.
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common law of criminal defamation in general or seditious
libel in particular, and no state court [had] ruled that the
free press clause of its state constitution rendered void
the prosecution of a libel.*'16

In sum, though a system of

prior restraints on the press, such as the English press
licensing system of the seventeenth century, did not exist
in eighteenth-century America, criminal remedies for
seditious libels, as articulated by English jurist Sir
William Blackstone, remained theoretically possible.17

2. need for a new national government
When Madison and his peers gathered in Philadelphia in
1787, resolving the seeming contradiction between speech and
press freedom and the English common law was not of prime
importance.

Rather, delegates to the Convention gathered

out of a common sense of urgency that a new, energetic
national government was needed to better administer the
affairs of their young nation.

Such an undertaking, as

Madison described, is "essential to that security against
external and internal danger, and to that prompt and
salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very
definition of good Government."18

16 Levy, 267.
17 Ibid. . 12.
18 Jacob E. Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 37," The
Federalist (Middletown, Connecticut:y Wesleyan University
Press, 1961), 233.
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Of the external dangers facing the United States in
1787 which warranted the creation of an energetic national
government, British, Spanish and French land claims on the
periphery of the new nation, as well as matters of
interstate and international trade, were undoubtedly the
most troubling.

At a bare minimum, a strengthened national

government of the kind eventually proposed would be better
able, both in terms of financing and organization, to raise
and support an army capable of defending the fledgling
nation's borders.19

Such a government would also have

enhanced authority both in its dealings with foreign
governments, as well as in its role of settling disputes
among the individual states.20

In addition, some have

argued that the principal motivation behind creating an
energetic national government was to simultaneously create
and nurture an energetic national economy.21

3.

internal dangers to self-government

The bulk of Madison's constitutional philosophy,
however, is concerned not with external threats, but with
the internal dangers faced by government.

As a political

philosopher and veteran legislator, Madison knew full well

19 See

generally, Cooke, ed.,"Federalist No. 3.”

20 See

generally, Cooke, ed.,“Federalist No. 8."

21 See
525 (1949).

generally, H.P. Hood &Sons v. Du Mond. 336 U.S.
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that the chief and most insidious obstacle to good
government is human nature itself.

Specifically, Madison's

constitutional philosophy emerges from a psychology of human
nature which understands that people are motivated largely
by selfish concerns and passions.22

In Federalist No. 10,

for example, Madison observes that:
[a]s long as the reason of man continues fallible,
and he is at liberty to exercise it, different
opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his
self-love, his opinion and his passions will have
a reciprocal influence on each other; and the
former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves.23
In other words, since human reasoning is imperfect,
individuals will form a variety of differing and imperfect
opinions.

These opinions, in turn, will be self-serving, to

the extent that man's reasoning is tied to his self-love,
and will attach themselves to man's irrational faculties —
his passions.
While Madison was certainly not the first to identify
self-interest as an underlying motive in human nature, his
observation is unique in that it stresses this interest as
the primary motivation in human nature.

As David Epstein

argues in The Political Theory of the Federalist:
[b]oth the economic view of self-interest which
has come to be associated with liberalism, and the

22 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the
Federalist (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984)
6.

23 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10,” 58.
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political hopes for self-abnegation which were
once associated with republicanism, obstruct an
appreciation of this important aspect of man's
nature, which is neither economic nor altruistic
but is selfish and political. Human selfishness
takes the form not only of self-indulgence and
exertion in the pursuit of self-indulgence, but
also of self-assertion.
For this reason politics
cannot be fully understood as either simply an
arena for the practice of virtue or simply a realm
for the competition or aggregation of interests.24
This realization that human behavior is best understood
as the result of selfish desires, including a desire for
self-assertion, is especially troubling for governments in
which citizens are allowed a participatory role in the
political process.

4.

the problem of factions

Madison, after systematically reviewing both modern and
ancient forms of popular government, concluded that
republics have a tendency to perish because individuals not
only hold selfish desires unique to themselves but unite
together in factions with others holding similar
interests.25 Madison defined factions to mean any "number
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or the permanent and aggregate interests of

24 Epstein, 6.
25 See generally, Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10."
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the community.”26

Controlling the effects of faction was

for Madison both the chief justification for and chief
obstacle to popular governments.27
Based on the lessons of history, Madison concluded
that: "there ... are two methods of removing the causes of
faction:

the one by destroying the liberty which is

essential to its existence;

the other, by giving to every

citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.”28 Madison rejected the first remedy as worse
than the disease of faction and characterized the second as
wholly impractical in that the fallibility of human
reasoning gives rise to different opinions.29

The problem

of control is further exacerbated by the fact that human
beings will form into factions for any number of
inexplicable reasons.

As Madison argued:

[a] zeal for different opinions concerning
religion, concerning Government and many other
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have
been interesting to the human passions, have in
turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to
co-operate for their common good.
So strong is
this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion

26 Ibid. . 57.
27 Ibid.. 56.
28 Ibid. . 58.
29 Ibid.
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presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent
conflicts.30
Again, the problem is not that humans form different
opinions and hold different interests but that they attach
these to their passions and thereafter seek to assert their
ideas and themselves on others in a manner which is
detrimental to the common good.

In that capacity, moreover,

humans possess unequal abilities to assert themselves.

In

the absence of laws, for example, the physically strong are
better able to assert themselves over the weak.

Even with

laws created by a popular government, those who are able to
better persuade their fellow citizens to adopt a particular
course of action or policy are likely to wield
disproportionate political power.

Similarly, these and

other inequities in the talents and abilities of individuals
will likely result in a further, inequitable distribution of
power.

As Madison observed:

[t]he diversity in the faculties of men from which
the rights of property originate, is not less an
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.
The protection of these faculties is the first
object of Government.
From the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring
property, the possession of different degrees and
kinds of property immediately results:
and from
the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors, ensues a division
of the society into different interests and
parties.31

30 Ibid. . 58-59.
31 Ibid.

21

In other words, not only does the disparity in human
reasoning give rise to different opinions, but it results in
an unequal accumulation of power and property as well,
causing yet further divisions and grounds for faction.
Most importantly, however, rather than controlling
these different faculties in order to stem the tide of
faction, Madison argues that it is the first object of
government to protect them.

In this respect, Madison

appears to offer a contradictory observation by suggesting
that government is required to protect something which
causes faction, which in turn is the destroyer of
government.

In this regard, Madison concludes that ” [t]he

inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of
faction cannot be removed;

and that relief is only to be

sought in the means of controlling its effects."32

5.
the extended republic:
controlling the effects of faction
(

The means that Madison proposed for relieving the
causes of faction are perhaps the most original and
ingenious contribution of the entire constitutional era.
Contemporary theorists, such as Montesquieu, argued that due
to the problem of factions, republican forms of government
are only practical in small countries comprised of a

32 Ibid. . 60.

citizenry with rather homogenous concerns and interests.33
Madison, however, appears to have built his theory on the
converse observation by David Hume that republicanism is
best suited to large countries with a multiplicity of
interests.34 Rather than relying on the similarity of
interests found in small nations, Madison argued that the
secret to controlling factions lay in expanding the republic
into a so-called "extended republic" in order to ensure the
richest possible diversity of interests.

Madison observed

that by doing so, the likelihood that one faction could gain
enough power to oppress the interests of others was greatly
diminished.

In an extended republic, Madison argued,

factions would simply counter-balance one another, and their
ill effects would essentially cancel each other out.
Moreover, a representative legislature confronted with the
plurality of interests in an extended republic would be
better able to resist the demands of special interests,
rising above the popular fray and discerning the best course
of action for the common good.

33 Montesquieu, De L'Esprit des Lois, book 8, chapter 16
(p. 362) in Epstein, p. 92.
34 David Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," Essays:
Moral. Political and Literary, ed. by Eugene F. Miller, rev.
ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 512-529.
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6.

natural aristocracy and the filtration of talent

Though these observations may sound elitist, Madison
and his peers had precisely this view of the role of
government.

Madison argued in Federalist No. 10 that the

principal advantage of an extended republican government is
that public views may be refined and enlarged "by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations."35 Moreover, Madison argued that in an
extended republic, electors "will be more likely to centre
on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most
diffusive and established characters.1,36 In other words,
just as the extended republic enables the counter-checking
of factious interests, elections in the extended republic
will eliminate the most factious candidates and select only
those with the proper character to discern the public good.
Edmund Burke, an English contemporary of Madison's, in a
November 3, 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol, observed
that:
Parliament [and I take him to mean all
representative legislatures] is not a congress of
ambassadors from different and hostile interests,
which interests each may maintain, as an agent and
advocate, against other agents and advocates; but

35 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10," 62.
36 Ibid. . 63.
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Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one
nation, with one interest, that of the whole;
where not local purposes, not local prejudices,
ought to guide, but the general good, resulting
from the general reason of the whole.37
Echoing this observation, Madison noted that:
[a] good government implies two things; first,
fidelity to the object of government, which is the
happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of
the means by which that object can best be
attained.
Some governments are deficient in both
these qualities: most governments are deficient
in the first.
I scruple not to assert that in the
American governments, too little attention has
been paid to the last. The federal constitution
avoids this error; and what merits particular
notice, it provides for the last in a mode which
increases the security for the first.38
Significantly, neither Madison's nor Burke's
observation places any emphasis on the capacity of the
governed to capably secure their own happiness, effectively
discrediting the notion that unrefined public opinion should
guide policy making.

Rather, they argue that government

alone is capable of transcending such mundane concerns as
local prejudices to secure the people's happiness.

In order

for government to honor this objective and to be considered
good by his definition, Madison maintains that it must
possess a knowledge about what constitutes the people's
happiness, and skilled enough in the mechanics of governing
to bring it about.

Most importantly though, as indicated

37 Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The
Founders Constitution: Maior Themes (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987), 392.
38 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 62,” 415.
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above, Madison believed that the strength of the system of
government devised by the Constitution lay in its ability to
effectively channel the knowledge and skills of those who
govern in a way that best serves the happiness of the
governed.

7. the assumption of virtue (public spiritedness)
Madison's political theory, though principally
concerned with human selfishness and self-assertion,
simultaneously appreciates, as a necessity, that the people
endorse the legitimacy of the system.

For Madison, the

chief expression of the people's endorsement undoubtedly
occurs when the people, acting in the capacity of voters,
select men of the best character to hold public office.
Nonetheless, the extended republic yields an even more
fundamental expression of commitment.

As Madison observed:

[jjustice is the end of government.
It is the end of
civil society.
It ever has been, and ever will be
pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty is lost
in the pursuit.
In a society under the forms of which
the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may truly be said to reign, as in the
state of nature where the weaker is not secured against
the violence of the stronger: And as in the latter
state [nature] even the stronger individuals are
prompted by the uncertainty of their condition, to
submit to a government which may protect the weak as
well as themselves:
So in the former state
[government], will the more powerful factions or
parties be gradually induced by a like motive, to wish
for a government which will protect all parties, the
weaker as well as the more powerful.39

39 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 52," 352.

In other words, on some level, Madison's political theory
assumes that on balance, the people, despite their factious
proclivities, recognize the importance of protecting the
rights of both political majorities and minorities;
accordingly, the people expect their elected officials to
recognize this importance as well.

As Gordon S. Wood

observes, so long as elected officials observe republican
principles, "the people [can] relax their jealousy and
suspicion and become open and trustful."40 Whether we call
it a commitment to justice, civic virtue, or "public
spiritedness,"

without this commitment, the founders

believed that no system of barriers (constitution, bill of
rights, separation of powers, federalism, etc.) could by
itself achieve good government.41 When asked what would
prevent Congress from passing laws to favor itself and a
select class of citizens at the expense of the People,
Madison answered:
the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and
constitutional laws, and above all the vigilant and
manly spirit which actuates the people of America — a
spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is
nourished by it.42
Nonetheless, while such a commitment may foster the
creation of popular government, Madison still recognized
that imperfect human reasoning renders such spirit

40 Ibid. , 109.
41 Ibid.
42 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 57," 387.
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insufficient to maintain good government.

Quite simply, as

Madison noted:
[i]f men were angels, no government would be
necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary.
In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
the government to controul itself. A dependence
on the people is no doubt the primary controul on
the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
By external controls, Madison is unquestionably
referring to the capacity of the extended republic to ensure
that "[a]mbition ... be made to counteract ambition.”44
8.
structural safeguards:
constitutional apportionment of power
Internal controls, on the other hand, deal more
specifically and technically with the structural design of
government itself so that such counteraction may be
maintained.

On the simplest level, Madison argued that the

Constitution observes "the political maxim, that the
legislative, executive and judiciary departments ought to be
separate and distinct.1,45

In fact, Madison argued that

” [t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may

43 Ibid.
44 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 51," 349.
45 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 47," 324.
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justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”46 On
this level, therefore, the Constitution delegates separate
spheres of authority to the three branches of government
primarily as a means of diffusing political power.

As a

further control on the accumulation of political power in
any one branch,' each branch is given a limited authority to
check the abuses of the others (i.e., the presidential right
of veto over legislation, the congressional right to
override presidential vetoes, the advise and consent powers
of the U.S. Senate over presidential appointments and
treaties, etc.).
While these fundamental checks and balances in the
federal government are familiar themes, perhaps less
familiar is the fact that Madison viewed federalism as a
fundamental check as well.

Since the Constitution of the

United States proposed a national government of limited
powers only, the presumption was that the bulk of political
power would continue to be exercised by the states.47 The
extent to which this was a concession to the political
reality of the day will be discussed shortly.

What is

important to emphasize here is that Madison's constitutional
vision was driven by an understanding of human psychology
which recognized that popular government, for the sake of
civil society, is not only necessary but likely to perish.

46 Cooke, ed., “Federalist No. 47," 324.
47 See generally, Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 14."
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Federalism, the various checks and balances of the national
government, virtue in the people and office-holders, as well
as the general tendency of the extended republic to
neutralize the power of factions, were the principal means
Madison embraced as the manner to make popular government
not only enduring but good.

CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ORIGIN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The political theory of James Madison, as described in
Chapter One, provides the intellectual context in which the
origin of the First Amendment is most meaningfully
understood.

Apart from its intellectual pedigree, however,

the origin of the First Amendment cannot be fully understood
without considering the political struggle from which it
emerged.

It is often forgotten, for example, that the First

Amendment was precisely that —

an amendment to the

fundamental framework of government crafted at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Indeed, it is important

to note that the Philadelphia Convention adjourned in the
fall of 1787, having carefully designed the framework for a
new national government, without ever seriously considering
whether speech and press freedom should play any role
whatsoever in the new government.

The circumstances under

which the Constitution was amended with the Bill of Rights
are explained as much, if not more, by the political forces
at work in America during the period 1787-1791 than by the
intellectual concerns embodied in the political theory of
the extended republic.

It is precisely these forces to
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which our attention must now turn.

A. The Constitutional Convention
At the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention on
Monday, September 17, 1787, delegate Benjamin Franklin
remarked that he doubted "whether any other Convention we
can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution.1,1
And despite many minor reservations, including some held by
Madison, all of the delegates to the Convention, except
three, essentially agreed with Franklin and signed the
Constitution sending it off to the states for ratification.
The three delegates who refused to sign did so for
reasons that were later to play themselves out in the
struggle for ratification eventually culminating in the Bill
of Rights.

One of them, Virginia delegate George Mason,

publicly stated three weeks after the convention adjourned
that he opposed the Constitution because, among other
things, it contained "no declaration of rights ..."2

As

the principle author of Virginia's 1776 Declaration of
Rights, Mason's objection might seem completely reasonable
until we consider that he waited until five days before the
Convention adjourned to suggest that a bill of rights be

1 Madison, Notes, 653.
2 Cecelia M. Kenyon, The Anti-Federalists (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1985), 192.
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included in the Constitution.3

Even more interesting is

the fact nearly a week before calling for a bill of rights,
he had already announced that he would "sooner chop off his
right hand than put it to the Constitution..."

Mason

reasoned that certain points [unrelated to a declaration of
rights] remained to be settled, and " [s]hould these points
be improperly settled [in the remaining two weeks of
deliberation], his wish would then be to bring the whole
subject before another general Convention."4

Edmund

Randolph, another member of the Virginia delegation to the
Convention who ultimately refused to sign the Constitution,
concurred in Mason's objection arguing that "the State
[ratifying] Conventions should be at liberty to propose
amendments to be submitted to another General Convention
which may reject or incorporate them, as shall be judged
proper."5

In reaffirming their opposition on the next to

last meeting of the Constitutional Convention, Mason and
Randolph, without any reference to a bill of rights,
announced that they were voting against the Constitution so
that they would be free to vote against it in their state's
ratifying convention.

In other words, having failed to

shape the Constitution to their satisfaction at the
Convention, they would attempt to amend, or if necessary,

3 Madison, Notes, 630-631.
4 Ibid.. 566.
5 Ibid.. 567.
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defeat it at the state level —

a forum where they had more

experience and wielded considerably more influence.
Interestingly, in devising the ratification process,
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention anticipated much of
the strategy that opponents to the Constitution, the socalled "Antifederalists," would later employ.

Gouverneur

Morris and Charles Pinckney tried, unsuccessfully, to insert
in the ratification provisions that state conventions be
called "as speedily as circumstances will permit."
Specifically, "Morris said his object was to impress in
stronger terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order
to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving it the go by.
By degrees the State officers, & those interested in the
State [Governments] will intrigue & turn the popular current
against it."6
Luther Martin, who had attended most of the
Philadelphia Convention as a member of the Maryland
delegation (but departed before the Constitution was
adopted), agreed that "after a while the people would be
[against] it, but for a different reason than that alleged."
He believed that the people would not ratify the
Constitution unless "hurried into it by surprise."7
Elbridge Gerry, the third delegate who refused to sign,
concurred with Martin and asked the delegates to reconsider

6 Ibid.. 566.
7 Ibid.
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their decision to require ratification by just nine states.
As Madison described, Gerry "represented the [proposed]
system as full of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of
distroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous
consent of the parties to it."8

In a final attempt to

prolong the ratification process, Gerry tried unsuccessfully
to restore a previously deleted provision that would have
required the consent of the Confederation Congress as
well.9
In all fairness, much of what these, and other
Antifederalists objected to in the proposed Constitution
stemmed from honest philosophical disagreements over the
nature of government, the separation of powers (including
federalism itself), and more generally, the understanding of
human psychology and political behavior advanced by the
Federalists.

Specifically, the Antifederalists worried that

the Constitution would not preserve a limited form of
national government.

Rather, they believed that despite the

purported safeguards of specific, enumerated powers, the
Constitution would create a consolidated national
government.

For example, through its powers to tax, make

treaties, raise an army and navy, and, most especially,
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.. 611.
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carrying into Execution,"10 the Antifederalists believed
that the new national government would result in a total
domination of the state governments and the people
themselves.11

In short, the Antifederalists rejected

Madison's entire concept of the extended republic, arguing
as the essayist "Agrippa" did that "no extensive empire can
be governed upon republican principles, and that such a
government will degenerate to a despotism, unless it be made
up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the full
powers of internal regulation."12
In their public remarks, however, the Antifederalists
frequently painted their objections to the Constitution in
bleak hyperbole.

The essayist "Centinel" accused the

framers of attempting to establish a permanent aristocracy,
a form of government "which ever abominates and suppresses
all free inquiry and discussion ..." as evidenced by their
having "made no provision for the liberty of the press, that
grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants ...."13
Luther Martin plumbed the depths of demagoguery by declaring
that:
I most sacredly believe [that the founders] object
is the total abolition and destruction of all
state governments, and the erection on their ruins

10 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
II Kenyon, ed., The Anti-Federalists, xli-xlviii.
12 Kenyon, ed., The Anti-Federalists. 132-133.
13 Ibid. . 13 .
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of one great and extensive empire, calculated to
aggrandize and elevate its rulers and chief
officers far above the common herd of mankind, to
enrich them with wealth, and to encircle them with
honours and glory, and which according to my
judgement on the maturest reflection, must
inevitably be attended with the most humiliating
and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by
the sweat of whose brows, and by the toil of whose
bodies, it can only be affected.14
These remarks are important, not so much for the dire
warning they sound about the founders' intentions, but for
what they suggest about the nature of the public debate that
ensued over the ratification of the Constitution.

Historian

Leonard Levy suggests that most opponents of the
Constitution genuinely feared, in varying degrees, the
proposed national government.15

Some Antifederalists,

however, deliberately exacerbated this climate of fear by
resorting to demagoguery in order to defeat the
Constitution.

As Levy argues, ,f[m]erely to denounce the

omission of freedom of the press and other liberties was
superbly effective and even useful as a mask for less
elevating, perhaps sordid, objections to the Constitution
concerning such matters as tax and commerce powers.1*16 As
the Constitution underwent ratification, charges that it
would eclipse the power of the states gave Antifederalists
in the state ratifying conventions a compelling reason to

14 Ibid. . 169-170.
15 Levy, 234-235.
16 Ibid.

37

reject it.

Charges that the Constitution would result in a

general repression of rights and create a permanent
aristocracy pervaded the popular rhetoric.

B. The State Ratifying Conventions
1.

Pennsylvania

News of the Constitution began filtering out of
Philadelphia in the weeks following the Convention, and,
after an official endorsement from the Confederation
Congress, the struggle for state ratification began.

The

Pennsylvania legislature, having been presented with the
Constitution the day after the Philadelphia Convention
concluded, immediately set about the task of calling for a
ratifying convention.

Nonetheless, by the time the

ratification convention convened in late November,
newspapers, pamphleteers, and speakers of every kind had
fueled a rancorous public debate.
Of this popular debate, Wat Tyler reminded his fellow
Pennsylvanians a month before their ratifying convention
began that:
few men comprehend the science of government, and,
that destitute of judgment, the people are only
influenced by their passions. Hence arises the
expediency of resorting to sound instead of sense;
and of bewildering the imagination with visionary
terrors, instead of instructing the understanding
with rational disquisition, or candid
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interpretation.17
On a more substantive note, the author M.C. observed in the
Pennsylvania Herald days later that while many men,
including many learned men, had been excited by the various
doomsaying Antifederalist tracts, their concerns were not
unreasonable, but rather stemmed from genuine patriotism,
"fearful for the liberty of posterity and anxious to prevent
future encroachments of Congress.1,18 M.C. went on to argue
that to prevent such encroachments, and in order to preserve
the liberty of the press as well as other rights, a meeting
of citizens should be called to draft a bill of rights to be
transmitted to the states for simultaneous consideration
with the Constitution.19
M.C.'s argument is especially significant in that it
foreshadowed the strategy that many of the Antifederalists
would take in the coming months, namely:

that the

Constitution itself was so defective as to warrant the
calling of a second convention to draft a new one.

While

not completely successful in Pennsylvania, this tactic did
succeed in encouraging twenty-one of the twenty-three
conventioneers who voted against the Constitution to

17 Merrill Jensen, et al., eds., The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution of the United States
(Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976),
2 :2 0 2 .

18 Ibid. . 2:204
19 Ibid.
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formally dissent: to ratification.

As drafted by Robert

Whitehill, the minority dissent essentially echoed the most
significant Antifederalist charges:

omission of a bill of

rights and the inordinate grant of power to the national
government which threatened state sovereignty making the
unamended constitution unacceptable.20
On the side of the majority, James Wilson articulated
the counter-strategy that the Federalists would successfully
employ throughout the ratification struggle.

Wilson argued

that the new federal government would be limited to the
exercise of specific, enumerated powers, and that since this
government was entitled to no specific authority to abridge
the rights of individual citizens, a bill of rights would be
unnecessary.

Furthermore, Wilson argued, those who were

citizens of states that already had bills of rights, such as
Pennsylvania, would still have their rights protected.
Citizens of states that did not have bills of rights,
moreover, were ample proof, based on the general liberty
afforded citizens throughout the Confederation, that such
declarations were essentially unneeded.21

20 Ibid. , 3:617-631
21 Robert Green McCloskey, ed., The Works of James
Wilson (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967), 2:145.
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2. Massachusetts
The twin themes of the need for a bill of rights and
amendments to preserve state power played themselves out
again in next state ratifying convention where the
Constitution was seriously challenged —

Massachusetts.

Though through a series of political maneuvers22 the
Massachusetts ratifying convention was packed with
supporters of the Federalist cause, Elbridge Gerry, by
publishing a list of his objections to the Constitution,
rallied the Antifederalist opposition.

Ultimately, however,

pleas for compromise by John Adams and John Hancock proved
to be more persuasive.

The essence of this compromise was

that although the convention would formally ratify, it would
do so only with the clear understanding that Massachusetts,
as well as the other states, would retain sovereignty in all
respects not specifically reserved by the national
government.

Moreover, the Adams-Hancock compromise resulted

in a suggested list of amendments to be considered at some
future date.23 Interestingly, these suggested amendments,
which included protections for the liberty of the press and
the freedom of conscience, were silent on the question of
free speech.

22 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic
(New York: Norton, 1972), 486.
23 See Michael Allen Gillespie, "Massachusetts: Creating
Consensus,” in Michael Allen Gillespie, et al., Ratifying
the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas
Press, 1989) 144-158.
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3. Virginia
With the ratification by Massachusetts on February 6,
1788, the call for amendments began in earnest.

In a letter

to George Washington nine days later, Madison described the
prospect of introducing amendments as a blemish on
ratification, but a blemish "in the least offensive form."24
In other words, nearly six months before the Virginia
ratifying convention convened, Madison, though essentially
unconvinced as to the necessity of amendments, feared the
prospect as little more than a nuisance.

As we will see,

this is exactly the strategy that Madison would employ in
his state's convention as well as in the First Federal
Congress;

in order to defeat the Antifederalists, he gave

them exactly what they demanded —

amendments —

giving them what they really wanted —

without

a second

constitutional convention.
As the Virginia convention approached, even Edmund
Randolph, one of three delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention who refused to sign, began having doubts about
the Antifederalist cause.

In a letter to James Madison

dated April 17, 1788, Randolph voiced "grave suspicions" of
the motives of those calling for amendments.

He believed

that a political game was being played by the
"Amendmentites," whom he feared "more and more daily;

not

knowing how far the scheme of those, who externally

24 Jensen, et al., eds., Documentary History. 4:505.
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patronize them, may internally extend."25
When the Virginia convention convened on June 2, 1788,
eight of the nine required states had already ratified.
Accordingly, Virginia's endorsement, or lack thereof,
particularly given its population and political importance,
would either carry the Constitution to victory or ensure its
ultimate defeat.

Support for the Federalist and

Antifederalist positions, moreover, was more or less evenly
split both in the convention itself and in popular opinion.
On the second day of the convention, Patrick Henry, who, as
legend has it, declined an invitation to be a delegate to
the Philadelphia convention because he "smelt a rat," lent
his considerable elocutionary skill to the Antifederalist
cause.

Henry declared that he had come to express the

uneasiness of his constituents on having been "brought from
that state of full security [the Articles of Confederation],
which they enjoyed, to the delusive appearance of things
[the Constitution]."

Henry rhetorically asked who had

authorized the Philadelphia Convention to speak for "We, the
People" instead of "We the States," in that "[s]tates are
the characteristics, and the soul of a confederation."26
Essentially, as others had argued before, Henry was
rejecting Madison's conception of the extended republic.

25 Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of
Rights. 1776-1791 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina, 1955), 167.
26 Jensen, et al., eds., Documentary Record. 4:930.
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Moreover, Henry's chief concern was the preservation of
state power.

George Mason echoed this line of attack by

arguing more specifically that history, "supported by the
opinions of the best writers [i.e., Montesquieu], shew us,
that monarchy may suit a large territory, and despotic
Governments ever so extensive a country;

but that popular

Governments can only exist in small territories [such as the
present states]."27 As a secondary consideration for
rejecting the Constitution, both Henry and Mason argued that
endorsing a national government of the kind proposed would
jeopardize rights.28
In response, Madison argued that:
on a candid examination of history, we shall find
that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power, by
the majority trampling on the rights of the
minority, have produced factions and commotions,
which, in republics, have more frequently than any
other cause, produced despotism.29
In other words, the size of the republic for Madison was
immaterial.

Whereas the causes of faction might have less

effect in a small republic, faction was, for Madison, a fact
of political life in popular government no matter the size
of the republic in question.

Consequently, the essential

dilemma facing popular government for Madison is not how to
maintain a modest-sized republic in order to minimize

27 Ibid. . 4:937.
28 Ibid. . 4:937-951
29 Ibid. . 4:990.

faction, but, rather, how to create
which the effects

a political culture in

of faction can be minimized. In this

regard, Madison believed that such a political culture was
possible only if a diversity of interests and factions could
be made to counter-balance one another.

Once again, the

conceptual devices Madison employed toward this end were the
extended republic, separation of powers, federalism, the
leadership of a natural aristocracy, and the virtue of the
people.
It was the reasoning of arguments such as these that
led Edmund Randolph to change his mind once again, this time
in support of the

Constitution.

On June 25, 1788,

recounted for his

fellow Virginians that:

Randolph

I went to the federal Convention ... I refused to
subscribe, because I had, as I still have,
objections to the Constitution, and wished a free
inquiry into its merits.
[But] the accession of
eight states reduced our deliberations to the
single question of Union or no Union ... When I
see safety on my right, and destruction on my
left, ... I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of
the former.30
And this, in an elemental sense, is the issue that remained
when all debate had concluded in Virginia and elsewhere.
Despite the misgivings of many Antifederalists, anti
nationalists, and those with various regional and economic
interests that felt threatened by the Constitution, and
despite the frequent sincerity and unfortunate demagoguery
with which these objections were articulated in the public

30 Ibid.
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imagination, the issue before the ratifying conventions was
simply, as Randolph argued, union or no union.
Once the issue of a second convention was put to rest,
all that the Antifederalists could hope for were amendments
to alter the gravest defects of the Constitution, which in
Virginia, was precisely the compromise reached.

Yet in

reaching this compromise, one last effort was made by the
Antifederalists to defeat ratification.

Since ratification

seemed inevitable in the closing days of the Virginia
convention, a final attempt was made to condition
ratification on the acceptance, by all of the states, of
certain corrective amendments.
clear.

To Madison, the strategy was

On June 25, 1788, he summarized the juncture at

which the convention had arrived:
If we propose the conditional amendments, I
entreat gentlemen to consider the distance to
which they throw the ultimate settlement, and the
extreme risk of perpetual disunion. They cannot
but see how easy it will be to obtain subsequent
amendments.
They can be proposed when the
legislatures of two thirds of the states shall
make application for that purpose; and the
legislature of three fourths of the states, or
conventions in the same, can fix the amendments so
proposed.
If there be an equal zeal in every
state, can there be a doubt that they will concur
in reasonable amendments? If, on the other hand,
we call on the states to rescind what they have
done, and confess that they have done wrong, and
to consider the subject again, it will produce
such unnecessary delays, and is pregnant with such
infinite dangers, that I cannot contemplate it
without horror. There are uncertainty and
confusion on the one hand, and order, tranquility,
and certainty, on the other. Let us not hesitate
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to elect the latter alternative.31
Two days later, the Virginia assembly endorsed ratification,
simultaneously endorsing a proposed list of amendments
(including a provision protecting speech and press freedom
based on Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights authored by
George Mason) to be considered by Congress at their first
assembly under the new Constitution.32

In short, when

confronted with a choice between a weak confederation and an
energetic national government, the Virginia convention chose
the latter, unamended, despite the plethora of arguments
that individual freedoms would be threatened in the process.
That the ratification convention ultimately put its trust in
the new national government to initiate corrective
amendments, in the precise manner that the Constitution
prescribed and that Madison advocated, indicates the extent
to which Madison's constitutional theory proved
irresistible.

!

4. New York

Eight days prior to Virginia's ratification, the final
critical state convention convened in New York.

Though

ratification, according to the terms specified in the

31 Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution as Recommended bv the General Convention at
Philadelphia in 1787. 2d ed., (New York: Burt Franklin,
1888), 629-630.
32 Ibid. . 657.
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Constitution, was already accomplished, without the
accession of New York, perhaps the most commercially
important state of the time, the character of the new union
would be tainted.

It was out of concern for a successful

convention, as well as to assuage fears nationwide, that
Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay,
published an anonymous series of essays, advocating the
merits of the proposed frame of national government.

These

essays became The Federalist, unquestionably the fullest
articulation of the theory underlying the U.S. Constitution.
The debate in the New York convention centered around
the same fundamental issues agonized over in the other state
conventions.

Underneath all of the objections and rebuttals

presented in the convention, though cast in the particular
concerns and interests of the empire state, the essential
question re-emerged:

would the new national government be

able to control itself, or would it usurp the sovereignty of
the state governments and obliterate the rights of the
people in the process?

As Cecil Eubanks noted, the

delegates to the New York convention generally agreed that a
strengthened national government was needed to provide some
consistency in matters of trade and commerce, but they
feared national power.

Though many favored ratification,

f

many also favored corrective amendments and perhaps a second

convention.33
Melanchton Smith, a prominent New York political figure
and opponent of the Constitution, temporarily gained the
upper hand in the convention when he championed an effort to
proceed with ratification on the condition of subsequent
amendments.

Ultimately, Smith retreated from this position

when presented by a letter from Madison to Smith's friend,
Alexander Hamilton, in which Madison argued that "subsequent
conditions" were unacceptable and that anything less than an
unconditional ratification would be a tainted
ratification.34 The following day, the letter was read by
Hamilton before the Convention.

Afterward, the proposal

calling for conditional amendments was altered to simply
recommend various amendments35, including a provision for
free speech and press protection for subsequent
consideration by the states and the First Congress.

Two

days later, the Convention ratified the Constitution, and
the new national government became an unquestioned reality.

33 Cecil L . , Eubanks, "Federalism and the Political
Economy of the Union," in Ratifying the Constitution. 328329.
34 Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961-1979), 5:184-185.
35 Ibid.
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C.

James Madison's Conversion to the Amendment Cause

Partisan tempers did not cool immediately with the
conclusion of the ratification process.

In Virginia,

Madison's political enemies, most notably Patrick Henry, not
only conveniently overlooked him for one of Virginia's two
Senate seats, but gerrymandered his home congressional
district to include as many pockets of Antifederalist
sentiment as they could.

Madison's opponent, James Monroe,

used this to his advantage by campaigning on the need for
amendments and by charging that Madison was "dogmatically
attached to the Constitution in every clause, syllable and
letter.”36

In the face of this political battle, Madison's

opposition to constitutional amendments began to soften.
This transformation in thought is significant, for, as
we have seen, Madison viewed factions, and not just and
well-ordered governments, as the chief threat to individual
liberties in a popular government.

In a letter to his

friend Thomas Jefferson, Madison argued that though he was
generally unopposed to a bill of rights, so long as the
enumerated powers of Congress were left intact, he did not
believe that such "parchment barriers" were necessary, nor
did he believe that they would accomplish their intended
function.

Specifically, he argued that:

[w]herever the real power in a Government lies,

36 William T. Hutchinson, et al., eds., The Papers of
James Madison (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1977), 11:418.
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there is the danger of oppression.
In our
Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the community, and the invasion of private rights
is chiefly,to be apprehended, not from acts of
Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents.37
In other words, given Madison's belief that factions are the
greatest threat to liberty and popular government, a bill of
rights would be unnecessary in that the various structural
devices of the extended republic, including federalism and
the separation of powers, were seen by him to be more than
adequate in controlling the effects of factions.
Clearly, though elegant from a theoretical standpoint,
the two weakest links in Madison's reasoning are: 1) his
assumption that the extended republic would produce a
talented, principled leadership essentially immune to the
whims of popular opinion, and 2) that the people
enough virtue to select virtuous leaders,
system.

possess

and to trust

the

The various devices of the extended republic, after

all, are only capable of countering the ill effects of
faction —

they cannot fully displace parochial concerns

with "public spiritedness."
Jefferson, in reply, suggested to Madison that a bill
of rights would be worthwhile if for no other reason that it
would put appropriate authority in the hands of the Supreme
Court to check the powers of Congress.

37 Ibid. . 11:297-30

This authority would
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also give the state governments, Jefferson argued, a similar
check.38

In other words, Jefferson presented Madison with a

rationale for a bill of rights that fit securely within
Madison's theory of balancing power against power and
faction against faction;

rather than weakening the devices

of the extended republic, a bill of rights could actually
serve to accentuate their efficiency.

Nonetheless, even

with this additional check, the system would demand an
essential residuum of "public spiritedness" in order to
function properly.
Even before receiving Jefferson's letter, Madison was
coming to accept the idea of a bill of rights.

Though he

had yet to embrace the idea of amendments, Madison argued
that if "pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper
mode,

[amendments] will be not only be safe, but may serve

the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning
opponents, and of providing additional guards in favour of
liberty."39 Whether by Jefferson's or his own reasoning,
Madison slowly began to warm to the idea of constitutional
amendments.

If nothing else, it is certain that Madison

considered himself morally bound to work for amendments, not
only because of promises he made during his campaign, but
because of the explicit instructions of Virginia's ratifying

38 Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950), 13:659-661.
39 Papers of James Madison. 11:404-405.
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convention.

D. The First Federal Congress and the Creation of
the First Amendment
The First Federal Congress convened in New York City on
March 4, 1789.

A quorum was reached on April 6th, and the

following month, as promised, Madison introduced the subject
of Amendments, but postponed making a formal proposal until
June 8th.

By the time Madison made his formal proposal, the

legislatures of Virginia (on May 5th) and New York (on May
6th) had already petitioned the new congress for a second
convention in order to address the serious defects of the
Constitution.

In order to mollify state concerns, Madison's

eventual proposal essentially synthesized the various state
recommendations (Massachusetts, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Virginia and New York) for corrective amendments,
including a provision protecting the freedoms of press and
speech.

In addition, Madison proposed two protections no

state had asked for, namely, that no person could be forced
to give up his property without just compensation and that
no state [emphasis added] could infringe the equal rights of
conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in
criminal cases.40
Despite Madison's efforts, Federalist and
Antifederalist sympathizers in Congress alike proved less

40 Veit, et al., eds., Creating the Bill of Rights. 1131.
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than enthusiastic.

Many Federalists still believed that a

bill of rights was unnecessary, whereas many Antifederalists
feared that if only rights-oriented amendments were adopted,
any chance of major structural amendments, or even of
another constitutional convention, would be lessened.41
Nonetheless, Madison pressed on.

Upon making his formal

proposal to the House, Madison argued that:
[h]is object was to quiet the mind of the people
by giving them some early assurance of a
disposition in the house to provide expressly
against all encroachments on their liberties, and
against the abuses to which the principles of the
constitution were liable.42
In response to arguments made by his fellow members that
there was more pressing business before the House, such as a
tax bill and a bill to create a lesser federal judiciary,
Madison responded:
I am sorry to be accessory to the loss of a single
moment of time by the house.... If I thought I
could fulfill the duty which I owe to myself and
my constituents, to let the subject pass over in
silence, I most certainly should not trespass upon
the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do
this; and am therefore compelled to beg a patient
hearing to what I have to lay before you. And I
do most sincerely believe that if congress will
devote but one day to this subject, so far as to
satisfy the public that we do not disregard their
wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the
public councils, and prepare the way for a
favorable reception of our future measures.43
Nonetheless, despite Madison's pleas, Congress was

41 Ibid. , xiv-xv.
42 Ibid. . 63.
43 Ibid. . 77.
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reluctant to undertake amending the Constitution, and voted
instead to put the whole matter before a committee of the
whole at some future date.

On July 21, 1789, Madison once

again asked his colleagues to consider the business of
amendments.

Again, the members of the House debated not the

worthiness of the amendments, but rather, questioned the
propriety of wasting valuable time when other, more
important matters were still pressing.

Massachusetts

Congressman Fisher Ames, an avowed Federalist, argued that a
special, select committee, rather than a committee of the
whole, would be better able to deal with the question of
amendments.

Elbridge Gerry once again articulated the

Antifederalist objection, arguing that the matter was too
important to be left to a select committee, but as yet,
Congress was still too busy to deal with the issue in a
committee of the whole.

In other words, Gerry wanted the

whole matter postponed indefinitely.

Nonetheless, the

majority Federalist position prevailed, and the House voted
to refer the issue to a select committee comprised of
members from every state.44
On August 13, 1789, Virginia Representative Richard
Bland Lee moved that the House should form itself into a
committee of the whole in order to consider the report of
the select committee on the subject of constitutional
amendments.

Once again, the opposition argued
i

44 Ibid. . 97-103.
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unsuccessfully against the motion, offering that the matter
was too delicate to be considered at a time when the House
had to contend with more pressing matters.45

After a

lengthy debate Concerning whether the amendments should be
incorporated in the text of the Constitution, as Madison
wanted, it was decided that they would appear as an appendix
to the Constitution, and with that, the individual
amendments were finally set for full consideration by the
House.46

Two days later, what would eventually become the

First Amendment, which many in our present day consider the
epitome of the spirit of liberty envisioned by the founding
fathers, was reluctantly taken up for discussion by the
First Federal Congress.
South Carolina Representative and Antifederalist Thomas
Tudor Tucker, upon the first reading of what was then the
fifth proposed amendment, moved to insert language
qualifying the speech and press freedom of individuals as a
means of instructing their representatives.

This proposal

ultimately resulted in more debate than any other question
as to the basic efficacy of protecting speech and press
freedom.

Pennsylvania Representative Thomas Hartley opposed

Tuckers's proposed insertion on straight-forward Madisonian
grounds.

He argued that:

[t]he power of instructing might be liable to

45 Ibid. . 104.
46 Ibid. . 112-128
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great abuses;
it would generally be exercised in
times of public disturbance, and would express
rather the prejudices of faction, than the voice
of policy; thus, it would convey improper
influences into the government.47
In support of Hartley, Connecticut Representative Roger
Sherman echoed Burke's understanding of representative
legislators by arguing that:
instructions were not a proper rule for the
representative, since they were not adequate to
the purposes for which he was delegated. He was
to consult the common good of the whole, and was
the servant of the people at large.
If they
should coincide with his ideas of the common good,
they would be unnecessary;
if they contradicted
them, he would be bound by every principle of
justice to disregard them.48
Only Elbridge Gerry openly supported the proposal by arguing
that if the people were sovereign, as contended, then it
would be inconceivable that they not also have."the right to
instruct their agents at their pleasure.1,49
Once again, it would be for Madison to clarify the
question at hand.

In general, Madison opposed Tucker's

motion because it spoke of a "doubtful" right, one which
many people, himself and those in state government included,
would find especially worrisome, particularly in light of
his dual objective of mollifying critics and preserving the
basic structure of government intended by the Constitution.
Madison agreed that the proposal was partially true, that

47 Ibid. . 151.
48 Ibid. . 151.
49 Ibid. . 152.
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the people most definitely have a right to speak and publish
their sentiments on political issues, and also
unquestionably have a right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.

Nonetheless, the proposition that

such views should obligate Congress in anyway, Madison
argued, was "certainly false."

With specific regard to

Gerry's remark, Madison agreed that the people are
sovereign, but asked:
who are the people? Is every small district, the
PEOPLE? and do the inhabits of this district express
the voice of the people, when they may not be a
thousandth part, and although their instructions may
contradict the sense of the whole people besides? Have
the people in detached assemblies a right to violate
the constitution or controul the actions of the whole
sovereign power? This would be setting up a hundred
sovereignties to the place of one.50
South Carolina Representative William Smith offered that if
Congress were bound by the instructions of constituents,
then states in closer proximity to Congress would have an
i

unfair advantage in that they would have greater ease
conveying their sentiments (owing to the communications
technologies of the day) to their congressmen.51 And
perhaps most acutely, Maryland Representative Michael Stone
argued that adopting the Tucker motion would change the
nature of the Constitution:
[i]nstead of being a representative government, it
would be a singular kind of democracy, and
whenever a question arose [as to] what was the

50 Ibid. . 152.
51 Ibid. . 153.
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law, it would not properly be decided by recurring
to the codes and institutions of Congress, but by
collecting the various instructions of different
parts of the Union.52
Quite simply, creating a system of government in which
public opinion played a fundamental role in the formulation
of public policy was not what the founders intended.

With a

few subsequent, minor revisions, the First Congress adopted
what would become the First Amendment without ever debating
the merits of protecting speech and press again.
Ultimately, the question of free speech and press, as well
as the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, were
forced upon the First Congress as part of the political
battle surrounding ratification of the Constitution, not as
a result of some deeply held constitutional theory.
On August 19, 1789, James Madison, in a letter to
Richard Peters, outlined his reasoning for supporting what
he described as the "nauseous project of amendments."
First, Madison argued that a declaration of rights is not,
in and of itself, an improper thing to be contained in the
Constitution in that every government has the propensity to
oppress its subjects, and a paper barrier, though frequently
transgressed, is never powerless.

Secondly, Madison argued,

many of the states ratified the Constitution with the tacit
assumption that certain amendments would be undertaken.
Thirdly, had amendments not been promised, Madison argued

52 Ibid.
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that the Virginia congressional delegation would have been
composed "almost wholly of disaffected characters...."
Fourthly, had the Federalists not raised the subject of
amendments, the Antifederalists almost certainly would have
if only to make the point that they were forcing their
opponents to keep their word.

Fifthly, and perhaps most

importantly, Madison argued that proposing amendments would
"kill the opposition every where..." giving greater
credibility to the new government in the process.

And

finally, if no amendments had been proposed, Antifederalist
arguments that the aim of the new government was to deprive
the people of their liberties would be reinvigorated, and
the likelihood of a second convention would be trebled with
Congress having failed to deliver on the corrective measures
it had been instructed to render.53

53 Ibid. . 281-282.

CHAPTER III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITHIN
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JAMES MADISON

Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter Two, James Madison
came around to the idea of amendments because he believed
they could be secured without seriously altering the balance
of powers achieved by the Constitution.

In sum, the

rationale for protecting free speech and a free press can be
fit securely within Madison's conception of the extended
republic.

As Madison noted in Federalist No. 51:

[i]n the extended republic of the United States,
and among the great variety of interests, parties
and sects which it embraces [and I take him to
mean the expression of these interests, parties
and sects by means of speech and press], a
coalition of a majority of the whole society could
seldom take place on any other principles than
those of justice and the general good; and there
being thus less danger to a minor from the will of
the major party, there must be less pretext also,
to provide for the security of the former, by
introducing into the government a will not
dependent on the latter; or in other words, a
will independent of the society itself.1
The capacity of the extended republic to accommodate
variety, neutralize faction and nourish an environment in
which self-government and good government can flourish

1 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 51," 352-353.
60
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simultaneously provides an excellent rationale for
protecting the freedoms of speech and press.

As we have

seen, at the heart of Madison's extended republic is the
proposition that the ill effects of faction (the greatest
threat to self-government) must be controlled.

So long as

the underlying interests that give rise to factions are
diverse, and so long as the powers of government are
sufficiently separated and balanced to prevent majorities
from asserting themselves in the political arena except in a
manner conforming to the best interests of the whole nation,
then the deleterious effect of factions will be neutralized.
In this sense, ideas, whether expressed in writing or
speech, can be seen to fit within Madison's theory of human
psychology which explains the inevitability of factions.

As

noted earlier, this theory argues that the cause of factions
are individuals and groups, who, having exercised their
highly fallible powers of reasoning, form a myriad of
opinions on every aspect of the human condition, to which
their passions are attached.

This combination of passion

t

and opinion, moreover, results in the human proclivity to
self-assertion, giving rise to both factions and their ill
effects.

If we consider the interchange of ideas in the

popular arena, as Madison essentially did, as simply a
manifestation of human nature and its faction-forming
propensity, then the challenge that self-expression
represents to self-government is the same challenge that
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faction poses to self-government generally.
Since extinguishing liberty is worse than suffering its
excesses, the way to best protect the freedoms of speech and
press within the context of Madison's theory is to provide a
framework, much like the extended republic, in which a wide
diversity of ideas are made to compete and balance each
f

other.

The separation of government powers, as well as the

degree to which representative legislators are separated
from factious minority opinion, provides a further barrier
minimizing the assertion of factious majorities (and their
ideas) in the process of self-government —

except in those

instances where a majority consensus is satisfied that such
an assertion is warranted by the need to serve the common
good.

In other words, by proclaiming that the freedoms of

speech and press are beyond the power of Congress, and given
that it is assumed that such protection will result in a
diversity of opinions and ideas being introduced into the
public imagination, the First Amendment, by embracing a
sphere of activity typified by the assertion of factions,
seeks to control the ill effects of those factions by
ensuring their rich diversity, and ultimately, their mutual
counter-action and neutralization.
In sum, Madison's constitutional philosophy, including
the First Amendment, results in a representative national
government constrained by a majority public opinion which in
turn is constrained by public spiritedness as well as the
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filtration mechanisms of the extended republic.

As Madison

noted in 1791:
[pjublic opinion sets bounds to every government, and
is the real sovereign in every free one. As there are
cases where the Public Opinion must be obeyed by the
government; so there are cases, where not being fixed,
it may be influenced by the government. This
distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide
many debates on the respect due from the government to
the sentiments of the people.... Whatever facilitates
a general intercourse of sentiments, [such] as good
roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and
particularly a circulation of newspapers through the
entire body of the people, and Representatives going
from, and returning among every part of them, is
equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and
is favorable to liberty, where these may be too
extensive, (emphasis omitted). 2
All of which adds another dimension, beyond the simply
political, explaining Madison's ultimate support for a
constitutional amendment protecting speech and press
freedom.

While it is clear how Madison was able to fit the

media protections of the First Amendment within his general
constitutional theory, it is less clear what the other
members of the First Congress, or the state conventions that
ultimately ratified the Bill of Rights had in mind.

Rather,

instead of providing a clear historical record, the
documentary histories of the First Congress and those of the
state conventions, reveal only apathy, ambiguity, brevity
and political intrigue.

As historian Leonard Levy notes,

while there is no doubt that Congress and the state
conventions cared about protecting speech and press,"no

one

2 Gaillard Hunt, ed., "Public Opinion," The Writings of
James Madison. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), VI:70.
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seems to have cared enough to clarify what [they] meant by
the subject upon which [they] lavished praise.”3

Levy,

moreover, offers what I think is one of the best examples
demonstrating that the founding fathers had little idea of
exactly what they were protecting.

Levy argues in The

Emergence of a Free Press that despite the colonial American
precedent of the Peter Zenger trial and another half dozen
similar cases, the concept of seditious libel remained
unchallenged before and after the First Amendment.

Levy

argues that the Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted by Congress
in 1798, were used with particular vehemence against
newspaper publishers critical of the Adams administration.
Surprisingly, despite the guarantee of the First Amendment,
supporters of the Act argued that the First Amendment did
not repudiate the common law concept of seditious libel—
namely, that harsh criticism of the government and those in
it, whether true or not, constitutes a libelous injury to
the government itself.4
As an example, Levy argues that the controversy over
the Alien and Sedition Acts, which pitted Jefferson's
Republican party against the Federalists, ultimately
resulted in the libertarian understanding of free press and

3 Levy, 2
4 Ibid.. 274-281.
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speech that we have today.5

For example, in opposing the

Acts, Madison articulated the significance of speech and
press freedom in a significantly different manner, and with
a stronger conviction than he had in the First Federal
Congress.6
The most compelling explanation for Madison's change
of heart, however, is found in the changing political
culture of the nation itself.

In his landmark work, The

Radicalism of the American Revolution, historian Gordon S.
Wood argues that the American Revolution set loose cultural
forces that eventually produced an uniquely American
paradigm of democratic government.

Specifically, Wood

argues that in the decades following the Revolutions
[t]he founding fathers were unsettled and fearful not
because the American Revolution had failed but because
it had succeeded, and succeeded only too well. What
happened in America in the decades following the
Declaration of Independence was after all only an
extension of all that the revolutionary leaders had
advocated. White males had taken only too seriously
the belief that they were free and equal with the right

5 The author wishes to stress that although the Levy
thesis has been-sharply criticized for its focus on
seditious libel as the principal touchstone by which to
measure the founders' commitment to free speech and a free
press, such criticism has left intact this author's
contention that the contemporary libertarian understanding
of the First Amendment was not soley the product of the
Constitutional Convention, the First Federal Congress, nor
the struggle to ratify the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights.
See generally, David M. Rabban, "Historical
Perspectives on the Free Press: [Book] Review Essay: The
Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression
in Early American History.” 37 Stanford Law Review 795
(1985).
6 Ibid.
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to pursue their happiness.
Indeed, the principles of
their achievement made possible the eventual strivings
of others-black slaves and women-for their own freedom,
independence, and prosperity.7
In this respect, the Constitution, and the political theory
from which it emanates, were ultimately swept up and
transformed by the cultural revolution set loose by the
American Revolution.

In combination, these revolutions set

in motion the twin contending themes of equality and liberty
which continue to play themselves out in the political life
of this nation.

A.

Madisonianism in the Modern Age

As it exists today, Madison's model, the Constitution,
encompasses commitments to both freedom and equality, while
employing the divergent interests of the extended republic
to keep these contradictory commitments in equipoise.
Although frequently used in conjunction, liberty and
equality, as political ideals, are actually at odds with one
another;

whereas liberty is focused on the state of the

individual in society, equality is focused on the state of
society at large.

For example, without a commitment to

equality, a commitment to liberty would result in an
inequitable hierarchy in society.

Similarly, without a

commitment to liberty, equality would result in the
degradation of individual rights.

Quite simply, without the

i

7 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1991), 368.
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capacity of the extended republic to neutralize faction, we
might easily live in a society that placed absolute value on
individual freedom, without any concern whatsoever for the
inevitable resulting disparities in wealth and power.

On

the other hand, without the extended republic, we might
easily live in a society that placed absolute value on
equality, without any recognition whatsoever of the diverse
talents and abilities that make each of us unique
individuals.
In short, without the Madison model, we might have no
solution for the Madisionian dilemma;

that is, how to

create and maintain a popular, participatory system of
government without allowing the will of the majority to
trample on the rights of the minority, while,
simultaneously, disallowing the minority the ability to
trample on the right of the majority to govern itself.

In

other words, the Madisonian solution to the Madisonian
dilemma seeks to avoid both majority and minority tyranny by
employing the extended republic to neutralize faction and to
assist the articulation of solutions to contemporary
problems in a manner that preserves good government.

By

doing so, the Madisonian model assumes that the values of
political majorities, both in Congress and the public at
large, when passed through the filter of the extended
republic, will ultimately articulate and advocate public
policy choices that serve the greater good.

For lack of a
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better term, Madison's model is nothing less than the model
of American democracy that survives to this day.

B.

Conclusion

On balance, it appears that the contemporary
incarnation of Madison's model has worked extraordinarily
well.

While we may no longer subscribe to Madison's elitist

assumptions about a natural aristocracy, voters still tend
to vote for candidates on the basis of character, not
issues.

As Michael Corbett observes, polling data reveal

that "[t]he primary function of elections is to determine
who will make policy decisions, not to determine what the
policy positions will be.”8

In this respect, the model of

the extended republic acts as a filter in elections as well;
as Corbett observes, ” [p]ublic officials who want to be re
elected are likely to be responsive to very broad segments
of the population and avoid offending any significant group
of voters.”9

It is in this manner, moreover, that the model

is self-correcting;

should a representative wholly

disregard constituent opinion which is highly salient and
unchanging, he or she is likely to be defeated at the ballot
box.
In essence, beyond the structural safeguards of the
Constitution, Madison's model of constitutional democracy

8 Ibid., 323.
9 Ibid., 322.
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requires only two things:

1) diversity in the extended

republic (opinions as well as persons) and 2) a certain
virtue, or public spiritedness in both elected officials and
the voting public.

The First Amendment serves the

requirement of diversity, and the mechanism of the extended
republic filters out the ill effects of faction.

What

remains as the driving force for the articulation and
enactment of good public policy is public spiritedness
itself.
It is an optimistic model;

it is a model which assumes

that beneath all of our differences and factional
allegiances lies a wellspring of commitment simultaneously
respecting the values of equality and liberty.

Such a

commitment, as Madison observed, is the genius of the whole
system.
For those who strive for social justice, the model is
undoubtedly frustrating and slow, for it articulates, but
does not drive, popular commitment to these values with
respect to contemporary issues of concern.

On balance,

however, there simply is no denying that the model generally
moves us in a positive direction;

a direction which

continually demonstrates that it is possible for a people to
govern themselves;

a direction which suggests that self-

!

government can be both enduring and good.
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